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1I. Introduction
Regulators face the important but diﬃcult task of determining appropriate capital re-
quirements for regulated banks. Such capital requirements should protect the banks
against adverse market conditions and prevent them from taking extraordinary risks.
At the same time, regulators should not prevent banks from practicing one of their core
businesses, namely trading risk. The crucial ingredients in the process of risk based cap-
ital requirement determination are the use of a risk measurement method, a backtesting
procedure, and multiplication factors, based on the outcomes of the backtesting pro-
cedure. Regulators apply multiplication factors to the risk measurement method they
use in order to determine the capital requirements. The multiplication factors depend
on the backtesting results, where a bad performance of the risk measurement method
results in a higher multiplication factor. Consequently, to guarantee an appropriate
process of capital requirement determination, regulators need an accurate backtesting
procedure, combined with a suitable way of determining multiplication factors. Based
on these requirements the regulators will assign the risk measurement method.
Since its introduction in the 1996 amendment to the Basle Accord (see Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (1996a) and Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(1996b)) the value-at-risk has become the standard risk measurement method. However,
although the value-at-risk may be interesting from a practical point of view, it has a seri-
ous drawback: it does not necessarily satisfy the property of subadditivity, which means
that one can ﬁnd examples where the value-at-risk of a portfolio as a whole is higher
than that of the sum of the value-at-risks of its mutually exclusive sub-portfolios. An
alternative, practically viable risk measurement method that satisﬁes the subadditivity
property (and other desirable properties 1) is the expected shortfall. Currently, a debate
is going on whether the use of expected shortfall should be recommended in Basle II.
So far, it is not in Basle II due to the expected diﬃculties concerning backtesting (see
Yamai and Yoshiba (2002)). Thus, although the value-at-risk does not necessarily sat-
1Namely, translation invariance, monotonicity, and positive homogeneity. These three properties are
also satisﬁed by value-at-risk.
2isfy the subadditivity property, it is still assigned by regulators, because of its perceived
superior performance in case of backtesting.
Both the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall (as well as many other risk mea-
surement methods) are level-based methods, meaning that one ﬁrst has to choose a
level; given this level, the risk depends on the corresponding left-hand tail of the proﬁt
and loss distribution. For the value-at-risk the Basle Committee chooses a level of 0.01,
meaning that the value-at-risk is based on the 1% quantile of the proﬁt and loss dis-
tribution. For the sake of comparison, one might be tempted to choose the same level
for alternative risk measurement methods, like the expected shortfall, so that they are
calculated based on the same left-hand tail of the proﬁt and loss distribution. When
the level in both cases equals 0.01 it seems obvious to expect that backtesting expected
shortfall will be much harder than backtesting the value-at-risk, even without trying
it out. However, comparing alternative risk measurement methods by equating their
levels does not seem to be appropriate from the viewpoint of capital reserve determi-
nation. From that perspective it seems much better to choose the levels such that the
risk measurement methods result in (more or less) the same quantiles of the proﬁt and
loss distribution. The 0.01-level of value-at-risk will then correspond to a higher level in
case of the expected shortfall. But then it is no longer clear which method will perform
better in backtesting. It is the aim of this paper to make this comparison.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we provide a general backtesting
procedure for a large class of risk measurement methods, which contains all major risk
measurement methods used nowadays. In particular, as a result a test for expected
shortfall is derived which appears to be new in the literature. Using the functional delta
method we provide a framework that requires the regulator only to determine the inﬂu-
ence function of the risk measurement method in order to determine the critical levels
of the capital requirements table. We show that the present backtesting methodology
in the Basle Accord is a special case. Furthermore, a simple method to incorporate
estimation risk is presented. The fact that banks have time-varying portfolio sizes and
risk exposures complicates the use of standard statistical techniques. We deal with this
3issue using a standardization procedure based on the probability integral transform also
used by Diebold et al. (1998) and Berkowitz (2001). The key idea of the standardization
procedure is that banks should not only report whether or not the realized proﬁt/loss is
beyond the value-at-risk, but also which quantile of the predicted proﬁt and loss distri-
bution is realized. Second, we establish, via simulation experiments, that backtests for
expected shortfall have a more promising performance than for the value-at-risk, when
the comparison is based on (more or less) equal quantiles instead of equal levels. In
this way we provide evidence for a viable risk based regulatory capital scheme using ex-
pected shortfall with good backtesting properties. Finally, we suggest a general method
to determine multiplication factors for the risk measurement methods using the backtest
procedure developed.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In Section II we review the most popular
risk measurement methods in current quantitative risk management. In Section III
we present the standardization procedure in order to take account of the time-varying
portfolio sizes and risk exposures. Section IV treats the backtesting of the Basle Accord,
its generalization using the functional delta method, and the incorporation of estimation
risk. Simulation experiments are presented in Section V. In Section VI a suggestion for
determination of multiplication factors is given. Finally, Section VII concludes.
II. Risk measurement methods
A. Deﬁnitions and notation
Though risk proﬁles contain much relevant information for risk managers, they become
unmanageable for large ﬁrms with many divisions and portfolios. Therefore, for risk
management purposes, risk managers prefer low dimensional characteristics of the risk
proﬁles. In order to compute these low dimensional characteristics they use a ﬁnancial
model m = (Ω;F;P), where Ω denotes the states of the world, F the information
available, and P the probability measure. A risk is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 Let a ﬁnancial model m be given. A risk deﬁned on m is an element of
4R(m) deﬁned as the space of all equivalence classes of real-valued measurable functions
on (Ω;F).
This deﬁnition, in which a “risk” is a random variable deﬁned on a given probability
space, follows the terminology of Artzner et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2000). Artzner
et al. (1999) deﬁned a risk measure for a particular ﬁnancial model.
Deﬁnition 2 Let a ﬁnancial model m be given. A risk measure, ½, deﬁned on m is a
map from R(m) to IR [ f1g.2
In order to allow for several ﬁnancial models, we use a class of ﬁnancial models
denoted by M. Each of these models deﬁnes a set of risks R(m). Following Kerkhof
et al. (2002) we denote a mapping deﬁned on M that assigns a risk measure deﬁned
on m for each m 2 M by a risk measurement method deﬁned on M; RMM. The most
well-known risk measurement method nowadays is the value-at-risk method which was
supported by the Basle Committee in the 1996 amendment to the Basle Accord (see
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1996a)).
Before coming to the formal deﬁnitions of the popular risk measurement methods
we present the quantile deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3 (Quantiles) Let X 2 R(m) be a risk for model m = (Ω;F;P).
1. Qp (X) = inf fx 2 IR : P(X · x) ¸ pg is the lower p-quantile of X.
2. Qp (X) = inf fx 2 IR : P(X · x) > pg is the upper p-quantile of X.
The deﬁnition of the value-at-risk method can then be given by
Deﬁnition 4 (value-at-risk (VaR)) Let a model class M be given. The value-at-risk





m : R(m) 3 X 7! ¡Qp (X=Nm) = Q1¡p (¡X=Nm) 2 IR[f1g;whereNmdenotesthereferenceassetinmodelm:
(1)
2Including 1 allows risks to be deﬁned on more general probability spaces, see Delbaen (2000).
5We use a reference asset N (for example, the money market account) to measure the
losses in terms of money lost relative to the reference asset. This allows comparison of
risk measures for diﬀerent time horizons.
Since the introduction of value-at-risk by RiskMetrics (1996), the literature on value-
at-risk has surged (see, for example, RISK Magazine (1996), Duﬃe and Pan (1997), and
Jorion (2000) for overviews). Though value-at-risk is an intuitive risk measure, the
reasoning behind it was more practical than theoretically grounded. Recently, Artzner
et al. (1997) introduced the notion of coherent risk measures having the properties of
translation invariance, monotonicity, positive homogeneity, and subadditivity. Their
ideas were formalized in Artzner et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2000), amongst others. The
value-at-risk method does not necessarily satisfy the relevant subadditivity property.
This means that we can ﬁnd examples where the value-at-risk of a portfolio is higher
than that of the sum of the value-at-risks of a set of mutually exclusive sub-portfolios
(see, for example, Artzner et al. (1999), Acerbi and Tasche (2002), and Tasche (2002)).
A practically usable coherent risk measure is the expected shortfall as given in Acerbi
and Tasche (2002).
Deﬁnition 5 (expected shortfall (ES)) The expected shortfall method with reference
asset N and level p 2 (0;1) assigns to a model m = (Ω;F;P) the risk measure ESm
given by




IEXI I(¡1;Qp(X=Nm)] + Qp (X=Nm)(p ¡ P(X=Nm · Qp (X=Nm)))
¢
2 IR [ f1g: (2)
Informally, value-at-risk gives “the minimum potential loss for the worst 100p %
cases”3 while expected shortfall gives the “expected potential loss for the worst 100p
% cases”. Therefore, the expected shortfall takes the magnitude of the exceeding of
the value-at-risk into account, while for value-at-risk the magnitude of exceeding is
irrelevant.
3Most value-at-risk devotees prefer the alternative formulation of “the maximum loss in the 100(1-p)%
best cases.”
6B. Which levels?
Both the value-at-risk and expected shortfall risk measurement method are deﬁned for
arbitrary levels p 2 (0;1). This leaves the issue of the choice of p open. Since we are
interested in protecting against adverse market conditions it is clear that p should be
chosen small. But how small? For value-at-risk the most common choices are p = 0:05
or p = 0:01 (the level chosen by the Basle Committee). In combination with the current
multiplication factors used by the Basle Committee, the 1% value-at-risk results in more
or less satisfactory capital reserves. In order to get a risk based capital reserve scheme
based on expected shortfall, we need to determine a level p for the expected shortfall.
In most comparisons between value-at-risk and expected shortfall their levels are taken
to be equal. This seems to lead to the general opinion that, although expected shortfall
has nice theoretical properties, it is much harder to backtest than value-at-risk (see
Yamai and Yoshiba (2002)), the main reason why expected shortfall is still absent in
Basle II.4 However, for capital reserve determination it seems to make sense to look at
comparable quantiles instead of levels. For example, take the median shortfall, that is,
take the median in the tail instead of the expectation.5 The median shortfall with level
2p corresponds to value-at-risk with level p. If we would compare the backtest results
of the median shortfall and the value-at-risk with the same level, we probably ﬁnd that
value-at-risk has a better performance than median shortfall. But for a valid comparison,
we should use the median shortfall with twice the level of value-at-risk, in which case
we ﬁnd equal performance. A similar reasoning applies to expected shortfall. In order
to have a valid comparison of the backtest results we should look at the quantiles and
not the levels. Doing this for the Gaussian distribution (as a reference distribution),
we ﬁnd p = 0:025 for the expected shortfall when p = 0:01 for value-at-risk. In case of
excess kurtosis we need to take a higher level for the expected shortfall for it to equal
the 1% value-at-risk. Since, in practice, we usually encounter distributions with heavier
tails than the Gaussian distribution, the level of 2:5% can be seen as a lower bound on
4We thank Jon Danielsson for pointing this out to us.
5We thank John Einmahl for this example.
7the level for equal capital requirement.
III. Standardization procedure
Let (ht)t2TT with TT = f1;:::;Tg (the test period) be a time-series of (in our case daily)
returns on a proﬁt and loss account (P&L) of a bank. Usually, the sequence (ht)t2TT
cannot be modelled appropriately as a sample from one single distribution, say F, due
to the fact that banks change the composition of their portfolio frequently. In general,
the risk proﬁle (the distribution of the P&L) of the bank changes over time. Therefore,
we allow (ht)t2TT to be drawn from a diﬀerent (marginal) distribution each period, that
is,
ht » Ft t 2 TT: (3)
A bank is required to report the riskiness of its portfolio every day by means of a risk
measure ½(ht), where ½(ht) denotes the risk measure for period t using the information
up to time t¡1, Ft¡1.6 In order to compute these risk measures the bank uses a sequence
of forecast distributions (Pt)t2TT, with corresponding densities (pt)t2TT.
Often Ft is assumed to belong to a location-scale family; that is, it is assumed that
the sequence f(ht ¡ ¹t)=¾tgt2TT is identically distributed (see, for example, McNeil and
Frey (2000) and Christoﬀersen et al. (2001)). However, this restricts the way in which
the procedure takes portfolio changes of banks into account. In this set-up moments
higher than two are only allowed to vary over time through the ﬁrst two moments.
More generally, we can use the probability integral transform (see, for example, Van der
Vaart (1998)) to go from a non-identically distributed sequence (ht)t2TT to an identically






= G¡1 (Pt (ht)); t 2 TT; (4)
In case Pt = Ft for each t 2 TT, L(yt) = G, otherwise L(yt) = Q 6= G. The following
6It would be more appropriate to write ½t¡1 (ht), but we suppress the subscripts for notational
convenience.
8lemma (see special cases in Diebold et al. (1998) and Berkowitz (2001)) gives the density
q of yt.
Lemma 1 Let ft (¢) denote the density of ht, pt (¢) the density corresponding to Pt (¢),
g the density associated with G, and yt = G¡1 (Pt (ht)). If
dP¡1
t (G(yt))
dyt is continuous and














Proof. Just apply the change of variables transformation to yt = G¡1 (Pt (ht)) and
the result follows.
In case the forecast distributions of the bank are correct, i.e., Pt = Ft, t 2 TT,
we have that q (yt) = g (yt). Thus, under the hypothesis that Pt = Ft, t 2 TT we
can go from a non-identically distributed sequence (ht)t2TT to an identically distributed
sequence (yt)t2TT with distribution G. We denote this procedure as standardization to
G. For example, Berkowitz (2001), uses G = Φ, the standard normal distribution, in
order to use the Gaussian likelihood for his Likelihood Ratio tests.
IV. Backtest procedure
After assigning a risk measurement method the regulator faces the important task of
determining the quality of the models that the regulated banks use in order to compute
the risk measure. One of the reasons that the value-at-risk approach is often preferred
to the coherent risk measures is the fact that the quality of value-at-risk models seems
more easily veriﬁable. Therefore, the choice of risk measurement method by the regu-
lator is based on the tools available to the regulator to verify model quality. In order
to motivate the regulated to improve their models, regulators often impose model re-
serves or multiplication factors (see, for example, the multiplication factors by the Basle
9Committee). In Section IV.A we review the backtest procedure of the Basle Committee.
Then we provide an alternative and more general procedure, in Section IV.B ignoring
estimation risk, and in Section IV.C taking estimation risk into account.
A. Backtest procedure of Basle Committee
In this section we brieﬂy describe the backtest procedure used by the BIS for determining
the multiplication factors for capital requirements. A full exposition can be found in the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1996b).
Banks need to produce T (T = 250 in the current BIS implementation) value-at-risk
forecasts (1% value-at-risk in the current BIS implementation) (VaRt)t2TT, where VaRt
denotes the value-at-risk forecast for day t using Ft¡1, the information up to time t¡1.
It is assumed that these value-at-risk forecasts (VaRt)t2TT are such that the exceedances
sequence (et)t2TT consists of independent elements with a Bernoulli distribution with
probability p, that is, Bern(p), where p denotes the quantile relevant to the value-at-risk
method employed. The exceedances (et)t2TT are deﬁned by
et = I I(¡1;¡VaRt) (ht); t 2 TT: (6)
By deﬁnition we have that
P(et = 1) = P(ht < ¡VaRt); t 2 TT: (7)
If ¡VaRt = F¡1 (p), with F the cumulative distribution function of ht, we have that
P(et = 1) = p and, consequently, the distribution of et follows a Bernouilli-distribution,
i.e., L(et) = Bern(p). Using the cumulative distribution of the binomial distribution
one may then compute multiplication factors based on the number of exceedances. For
completeness, we present Table 2 from Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1996b)
in Table I.
The capital requirement can then be computed as the product of the value-at-risk
at time t, VaR0:01
t , multiplied by a multiplication factor, mft, that is determined by the
10Table I
BIS multiplication factors
The table shows the plus factors (multiplication factor = 3 + plus factor) used by the
BIS for capital requirements based on a sample of 250. Tables for other sample sizes
can be constructed by letting the yellow zone start when the cumulative probability















yellow zone 7 0,65 99,60
8 0,75 99,89
9 0,85 99,97
red zone ¸ 10 1,00 99,99
results of a backtest of model m on the previous T (T = 250 in Basle Accord) days,7
CRt = mft ¢ VaR0:01
t : (8)
The backtest procedure given by the Basle Committee described above has some
serious shortcomings. It assumes that the exceedances (et)
T
t=1 are i:i:d: while empirical
evidence shows a clustering phenomenon in the exceedances (see, for example, Berkowitz
and O’Brien (2002)). Building on our results in Section IV.B we show in Appendix A
how one can perform an (unconditional) test in case of dependence. Another drawback
is that the above procedure does not take estimation risk into account which manifests
itself in the fact that VaRt = b F¡1 (p) which is not necessarily equal to F¡1 (p). Due
to the limited amount of data there is likely some inaccuracy in the estimate for the















Committee on Banking Supervision (1996b)). Furthermore, the multiplication factors are set every 3
months.
11value-at-risk which in eﬀect causes an estimation error in the exceedances (compare West
(1996)). This issue is treated in Section IV.C. A ﬁnal drawback is that by transforming
the information of the distribution into one characteristic (exceeding of value-at-risk or
not) we lose relevant information of the return distribution (see also Berkowitz (2001)).
In Section V we see that the power of the test is aﬀected by removing this information.
B. General backtest procedure
We assume given a sample of transformed data (yt)t2TT standardized to the actual
distribution Q, possibly unequal to the postulated standardized distribution G. In this
subsection we refrain from possible estimation risk in G which will be discussed in the
next subsection. In Section II, we deﬁned risk measurement methods as functions of
random variables (deﬁned on a ﬁnancial model m = (Ω;F;P)) following the quantitative
risk measurement literature. For the purpose of testing it is more convenient to deﬁne
the risk measurement method as a functional, % : DF ! IR, of a distribution function
to IR [ 1.8 Thus, RMMm (X) = %(F) for risk X if F is the distribution function of
X associated with model m. The null hypothesis H0 : Q = G can be tested against
numerous alternatives. For example, Berkowitz (2001) tests this hypothesis using a
likelihood ratio (LR) test using the Gaussian likelihood (H1 : Q 6= G = Φ) and a
censored Gaussian likelihood (H1 : Q(¡1;Q¡1(p)] 6= G(¡1;G¡1(p)]).9 Using the censored
Gaussian likelihood has the advantage that it ignores model failures in the interior of
the distribution: only the tail behavior matters. Following this line of reasoning, we use
risk measurement methods which focus by construction on the tail behavior to evaluate
the null hypothesis. We do not directly care about conservative models, that is, the
true risk %(Q) is smaller than or equal to %(G), the risk expected by our model. Since
we do not want that the model underestimates the risk, the alternative is taken to be
H1 : %(Q) > %(G).
8DF denotes the space of all distribution functions, that is, all non-decreasing cadlag functions F on
[¡1;1] with F(¡1) ´ limx!¡1 F(x) = 0 and F(1) ´ limx!1 F(x) = 1. DF is equipped with the
metric induced by the supremum norm.
9For distribution function F, F(¡1;F¡1(p)] denotes the left tail of the distribution up to the p
th
quantile.
12If % : DF ! IR is Hadamard diﬀerentiable on DF, we can apply the functional delta
method (see, for example, Van der Vaart (1998) Thm. 20.8)
p







Ãt (Q) + op (1); IEÃt (Q) = 0; IEÃ2
t (Q) < 1; (9)
where QT denotes the empirical distribution of the random sample (yt)t2TT and Ãt (Q)
denotes the inﬂuence function of the risk measurement method % at observation t. In
Appendix C we show that common risk measures such as value-at-risk and expected















with V = IEÃ2










estimated under the alternative. Some important examples are:
Example 1 (Value-at-risk) In the case of value-at-risk the inﬂuence function Ã (Q) is
given by
ÃVaR (Q) =









This leads to the following test statistic















1 denotes the distribution with weights one half assigned to the Â
2
1 distribution and one
half assigned to the degenerate distribution with probability mass in zero. (x)
+ denotes max(0;x).




















¢ + VaR(QT); (14)




Example 2 (Exceedances) In the case of the number of exceedances, the inﬂuence
function Ã (Q) is given by
Ãexc (Q) = p ¡ I I(¡1;Q¡1(p)] (x); (15)
and
IEÃ2
exc (Q) = p(1 ¡ p) (16)







The critical numbers of exceedances for the yellow and red zones are given by
Excyellow =
p
k0:95Tp(1 ¡ p) + pT
Excred =
p
k0:9999Tp(1 ¡ p) + pT (18)
For the regular backtest size of 250, these critical values are equal to the exact setting
of the binomial distribution used by the BIS.
Example 3 (Expected shortfall) In the case of ES the inﬂuence function Ã (Q) is given
14by























































































In appendix B, IEÃ2
t (G) is given for the Gaussian case G = Φ.
C. Estimation risk
The backtesting procedures described in this section assume that the forecasted distri-
butions (Pt)t2TT of the proﬁt/loss are given. It seems natural to penalize banks with a
plus factor for using inappropriate model families, but not for just having to estimate a
correctly speciﬁed model (assuming that they use their data eﬃciently). In order to do
so, we derive in this section backtest procedures that take estimation risk into account.
15Again, we use the standardization procedure described in Section III. We assume
given a random estimation sample (yt)t2Te , Te = f¡N + 1;:::;0g, and a random testing







; n = T;N
where Ã (¢) is the inﬂuence function of %(¢). This yields (still under the null)
p
T (%(GT) ¡ %(GN)) =
p





N (%(GN) ¡ %(G))
d ! N
¡




N ! c as N ! 1 and T ! 1.
If the estimation period would grow with time, c would tend to zero. In practice, one
usually speciﬁes a ﬁnite ﬁxed estimation period (for example, 2 years) and computes
the risk measure based on this estimation period. This is a so-called rolling window
estimation procedure, which can be approximated in our setting by taking c = T
N in
(23).
For the examples in IV.B we can derive the critical values for the yellow and red
zones in the same way by replacing V by (1 + c)V . With the incorporation of estimation
risk in the backtesting procedure we introduce an additional degree of freedom for the
regulator, namely the choice of c (or N, since T could already be chosen by the regulator).
V. Simulation results
In this section we compare the ﬁnite sample behavior of the backtest procedures. First,
we determine the actual size of the tests for the exceedances ratio, value-at-risk, and
expected shortfall. For simplicity, we take Ft = L(ht) = N (0;1), t 2 TT. To check
the performance of the tests for size, we take Pt = Ft, t 2 TT, and set the signiﬁcance
level ® = 0:05. We verify the performance of the tests given in the examples in Section
16Table II
Simulation results for size of tests
This table presents the coverage ratios (in percentages) if Ft = Pt = N (0;1)
for t 2 TT for T = 125, 250, 500, and 1000. The argument H0 denotes
that the variance used is IEÃ2











. Tail0:025 denotes Berkowitz tail test. The
number of simulations equals 10,000.
T Exceedances VaR0:01 (H0) VaR0:01 (H1) ES0:025 (H0) ES0:025 (H1) Tail0:025
125 3:75 2:75 1:81 2:64 3:24 3:05
250 4:17 4:81 2:87 5:14 4:64 5:42
500 6:63 2:91 2:27 9:38 8:10 5:16
1000 4:51 3:87 2:98 4:34 2:63 5:33
IV.B using G = Φ, the standard normal distribution.11 The tests are compared to the
censored LR test of Berkowitz (2001), which we denote as the Berkowitz tail test. Table
II shows the results of the performance of the size of the tests. We see that the size for
the three tests (Exceedances, value-at-risk, and expected shortfall) seem reasonable for
the common sample size of 250. The Berkowitz tail test seems to converge a bit faster.
Next, we investigate the power of the diﬀerent tests. In practice, ﬁnancial time series
often exhibit excess kurtosis with respect to the normal distribution and have longer left
tails. We consider three alternatives that replicate (parts of) this behavior. First, we use
Ft = L(ht) = t5, the student t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom. This distribution
has heavier tails than the normal distribution, but is still symmetric. Second, we use two
alternatives from the Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG) family.12 The NIG distribution
allows one to control both the level of excess kurtosis and the skewness. We consider
two cases: a symmetric case with a moderately high kurtosis, ¯ = 0; ® =
p
¯2 + 1; ± =
11Using G = U [0;1] results in very poor results for smaller sample sizes. The reason is that by
transforming the data to uniform random numbers the symmetry in the test is lost due to the non-linear
shape of F.



















expf¯ (x ¡ ¹)g;
with q (x) =
p




; ¹ = 0 and a case where the distribution is very skewed to the left and
has a large kurtosis, ¯ = ¡0:25; ® =
p
¯2 + 1; ± = 1=
¡
1 + ¯2¢
; ¹ = 0. Table III
contains the results. We see that for both the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall
the tests with variance evaluated under the null hypothesis have (far) more power. The
diﬀerence with the test using the estimated variance under the alternative narrows when
the sample size increases. The test for expected shortfall performs best in detecting the
misspeciﬁcation; the number of exceedances test has less power than the value-at-risk
test and the expected shortfall test. The Berkowitz tail test also performs well and,
therefore, seems a worthwhile auxiliary test, but, in general, trails the test for expected
shortfall. Especially for the shorter sample sizes the test for expected shortfall performs
better.
Finally, we take estimation risk into account. In Table IV the results are shown for
an equal estimation and testing period. It gives the expected result that the longer the
samples the better the power of the tests. However, the performance of the test for
value-at-risk with the variance evaluated under the alternative is quite bad. In Table V
we ﬁxed the testing period to 1 year (250 days) and varied the estimation period. As
expected the results improve for longer estimation periods. Again, the performance of
the test for value-at-risk with the variance evaluated under the alternative is quite bad.
Concluding, we ﬁnd that the performances of the tests with the variance evaluated
under H0 have far more power than the tests with the variance evaluated under H1 for
sample sizes realistic for ﬁnancial data. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the performance for
the size of the tests of the 2:5% expected shortfall is about equal to the 1% value-at-risk.
However, the power of the 2:5% expected shortfall test is much better than that of the
1% value-at-risk.
VI. Multiplication factors
In this section we propose a method to compute multiplication factors for capital require-
ments determination. Our starting point is the test statistic (10). If the test statistic















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21too low. The question then is by which multiplication factor %(G) at least should be
increased, such that the test statistic does no longer result in rejection of the null. Let
%¤ (QT) the realized value of %(Q). Then the minimum multiplication factor, mf, for
which the null hypothesis would not be rejected follows from setting 10 equal to k®, the







More generally, we may want to use a basis multiplication factor (bmf) and we may
want to cap the multiplication factor at some upper value (limit). Using the fact that



































We show the results for our proposed multiplication factor applied to value-at-risk,
and expected shortfall in Figure 1, where we use G = Φ, ® = 0:05, bmf = 3, and limit =
4. On the horizontal axis we plot the quantiles of the distribution of the test statistic in
10 under the null hypothesis and on the vertical axis the resulting multiplication factors.
As a benchmark we also plot the multiplication factors when using the current Basle
procedure (now case as a function of the quantiles of the corresponding test under the
null). We see that the multiplication factors according to our proposal seem to compare
favorably with those according to the Basle procedure. Moreover, the multiplication
factors for expected shortfall are slightly lower than for value-at-risk. This has to do
with the result that expected shortfall is more accurately estimated under the null than
value-at-risk, i.e., the variance V in case of expected shortfall is smaller than in case of
value-at-risk.
In Figure 2 we report the results of applying the multiplication factors from (25) to
value-at-risk and expected shortfall, using again the outcomes of the Basle procedure
as a benchmark. We consider two cases: ﬁrst, we look at the case where the model
13k® denotes the ®







22Figure 1. Multiplication factors
This ﬁgure shows the multiplication factors on the vertical axis against the quantiles
of the test statistic on the horizontal axis. We used G = Φ, ® = 0:05, and a basic
multiplication factor bmf= 3.
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Figure 2. Multiplication factors (size, power)
This ﬁgure shows the simulated cdf of the multiplication factors. In the upper panel
the case of Ft = N
¡
¹;¾2¢
is shown. In the lower panel we have the case where Ft =
NIG(®;¡0:25;±;¹). In both panels Pt = N
¡
¹;¾2¢
. The number of days equals 250
and the number of simulations equals 10;000.
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23is correct, Pt = Ft = N
¡
¹;¾2¢




and Ft = NIG(®;¡0:25;±;¹) with ®;±;¹ as before, being the case
where the distribution is very skewed to the left and has a large kurtosis.
The results of the correctly speciﬁed case reﬂect the outcomes presented in the
previous ﬁgure: expected shortfall, having the lowest multiplication factors, performs
best. Notice that the multiplication factor scheme from the current Basle Accord results
in (too) large multiplication factors. In the second case of a misspeciﬁed model we see
that the test using expected shortfall results in higher factors in more cases (due to the
higher power) than the test using value-at-risk. For both expected shortfall and value-
at-risk the punishment depends smoothly on the outcome of the test. The multiplication
factors according to the current Basle Accord more or less correspond to those of value-
at-risk and expected shortfall, but in a heavily non-smooth way.
Concluding, in the case that the bank uses a correctly speciﬁed model, we ﬁnd
that the capital requirement scheme using expected shortfall leads to the least severe
punishments. On the basis of the current Basle Accord banks would be punished more
often and then also severely. Furthermore, in case of a misspeciﬁed model, we ﬁnd that
the capital requirement scheme using expected shortfall rejects the misspeciﬁed models
most often, the multiplication factor depends smoothly on the size of the misspeciﬁcation
found and the variance in the multiplication factors is low.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper we suggested a backtest framework for a large and relevant group of risk
measurement methods using the functional delta method. We showed that, for a large
group of risk measurement methods containing all currently used risk measurement
methods, the backtest procedure can readily be found after computing the appropriate
inﬂuence function of the risk measurement method. The inﬂuence functions for value-
at-risk and expected shortfall are provided. Since this general framework is based on
asymptotic results, we investigated whether the procedure is appropriate for realistic
ﬁnite samples sizes. The results indicate that this is indeed the case, and that, contrary
24to common belief, expected shortfall is not harder to backtest than value-at-risk if we
adjust the level of expected shortfall. Furthermore, the power of the test for expected
shortfall is considerably higher than that of value-at-risk. Since the probability of de-
tecting a misspeciﬁed model is higher for a given value of the test statistic, this allows
the regulator to set lower multiplication factors. We suggested a scheme for determin-
ing multiplication factors. This scheme results in less severe penalties for the backtest
based on expected shortfall compared to backtests based on value-at-risk, and the cur-
rent Basle Accord backtesting scheme in case the test incorrectly rejects the model. In
case of a misspeciﬁed model the multiplication factors are on average about the same
for all tests. However, the multiplication factors based on the expected shortfall test are
smooth and have low variance.
Thus, the prospects for setting up viable capital determination schemes based on
expected shortfall seem promising.
25A. Dependent observations
In this appendix we indicate how we can perform an unconditional test in case of de-
pendent observations. Recall (9)
p







Ãt (G) + op (1); IEÃt (G) = 0; IEÃ2
t (G) < 1:
The dependence is in the sequence (Ãt (G))t2TT. We have
p
T (%(GT) ¡ %(G))
d ! N (0;V );
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1 X
j=1









V can be estimated consistently in a number of ways. A popular method is the estimator
of Newey and West (1987). Some alternatives are provided by Andrews (1991) and






where b V denotes an estimator of V .
B. The Gaussian case
Let Á(x) denote the density function of the standard normal N (0;1) distribution and
zp the pth quantile of the standard normal distribution. The value-at-risk in case of a
26normal distribution N (0;1) is given by
VaRp (X) = ¹ + zp¾; (27)
and the expected shortfall is given by










































Proposition 1 VaRp is Hadamard diﬀerentiable and its inﬂuence function is given by
ÃVaR (Q) =
p ¡ I I(¡1;Q¡1(p)] (x)
q (Q¡1 (p))
:
Proof. See, for example, Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) Lemma 3.9.20.
27Proposition 2 ESp is Hadamard diﬀerentiable with inﬂuence function














¡ ES(Q) + VaR(Q):
Proof.
Apply the chain rule for Hadamard diﬀerentiable functions (see, for example, Van
der Vaart and Wellner (1996) Lemma 3.9.3) to the quantile function and the mean.
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